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Recent ethical and legal challenges have arisen concerning the rights of 
individuals over their IVF embryos, leading to questions about how, when 
the wishes of parents regarding their embryos conflict, such situations 
ought to be resolved. A notion commonly invoked in relation to frozen 
embryo disputes is that of reproductive rights: a right to have (or not to 
have) children. This has sometimes been interpreted to mean a right to 
have, or not to have, one’s own genetic children. But can such rights 
legitimately be asserted to give rise to claims over embryos? We examine 
the question of property in genetic material as applied to gametes and 
embryos, and whether rights over genetic information extend to grant 
control over IVF embryos. In particular we consider the purported right not 
to have one’s own genetically related children from a property-based 
perspective. We argue that even if we concede that such (property) rights 
do exist, those rights become limited in scope and application upon 
engaging in reproduction. We want to show that once an IVF embryo is 
created for the purpose of reproduction, any right not to have genetically-
related children that may be based in property rights over genetic 
information is ceded. There is thus no right to prevent one’s IVF embryos 
from being brought to birth on the basis of a right to avoid having one’s 
own genetic children: although there may be reproductive rights over 
gametes and embryos, these are not grounded in genetic information. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00581.x   
 
Case Study 
Of all the controversies surrounding the creation and use of IVF embryos 
none seem more emotive than when disputes over the fate of the embryos 
arise between the parties involved. One such recent UK case was that of 
Natalie Evans. In this case, Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others1, Ms 
Evans was diagnosed with ovarian cancer. Prior to treatment for the cancer 
she underwent In Vitro fertilisation with her partner. Six embryos were 
created and stored. She subsequently had treatment for the cancer which 
rendered her infertile. Before any attempt at implantation had taken place 
the couple separated whereupon Ms Evans’ partner, Mr. Johnston, wrote to 
the fertility clinic asking them to destroy the embryos. Ms Evans brought a 
claim asking that Mr. Johnston be required to restore his consent to the 
storage and use of the embryos. The High Court2 rejected her claim and this 
decision was upheld by the court of appeal3. The European Court of Human 
                                                 
1
 [2004] EWCA Civ 727. 
2
 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd and others [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam). 
3
 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd and others [2004] EWCA (Civ) 727. 
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Rights4 also rejected her claim but she has been given leave to appeal to the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court. 
There were undoubtedly a number of significant factors at play in 
this case but it seems that for Ms. Evans and Mr. Johnston it was the issue 
of genetics that must have been of overriding importance. That the embryos 
were their genetic progeny has to be seen to be at the root of the matter, 
otherwise there could have been no dispute. The reasons for this are clear. 
Ms. Evans wanted her own child and saw this as her only chance to do so 
following her treatment for ovarian cancer. For her, her own child must 
necessarily mean her own genetically related child. If it did not then surely 
she would have been content to either adopt a child or to use donated 
gametes to create genetically unrelated embryos for implantation. Equally 
for Mr. Johnston the important fact was that the embryos were his genetic 
progeny, and, if implanted, could lead to him having genetically related 
children. Presumably he would not have been at all bothered had Ms. Evans 
decided to adopt a child or to undergo IVF with the aforementioned donor 
gametes, he was only concerned about these particular genetically-related 
embryos. 
 
Genetics, Reproductive Rights, and Parenthood 
The above case illustrates, among other issues, the tremendous importance 
that is placed on genetic relationships by many people in today’s society, 
particularly in relation to reproductive matters. The perceived significance 
of having one’s own biological children has indeed been the primary 
impetus for the development of many reproductive technologies. In vitro 
fertilisation was designed to enable couples who could not reproduce 
naturally to conceive their own biological and genetic children, from their 
own gametes. Donor gametes can be used where one partner is completely 
infertile, to allow one party at least to serve as a genetic parent if both 
cannot; in these circumstances it is not uncommon for gametes from a 
relative of the infertile partner to be used, so that some genetic relationship 
to both birth parents is maintained5. If a woman is unable to carry and bear 
children, the use of a surrogate birth mother still permits her to have and 
raise her genetic offspring. All these interventions are now widely used to 
give people the opportunity to reproduce and pass on their genes who might 
otherwise have been denied this chance. Further, there are several new 
technologies still under development which might be applied towards the 
same goal. Artificial gametogenesis may one day be used to enable people 
who cannot produce viable gametes (or perhaps even compatible gametes – 
such as a couple of the same sex) to reproduce genetically; even 
                                                 
4
 Evans v United Kingdom (App No 6339/05) (ECHR). 
5
 L. Halman, A. Abbey & F. Andrews. Attitudes about infertility interventions among 
fertile and infertile couples. Am J Public Health 1992; 82: 191-194. 
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reproductive cloning has been suggested as a means to allow genetic 
reproduction, albeit of a slightly different nature6. 
The extensive use of artificial reproductive technologies and the 
attention devoted to extending the limits of these methods in order to allow 
more people to reproduce genetically illustrate the value that is placed on 
genetic relatedness as a part of parenthood, in addition to birth parentage 
and upbringing. On the other side of the artificial reproduction equation, the 
UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has recently ruled 
that children born from donated gametes should be entitled to know their 
genetic parentage7, once again emphasising the socially perceived 
importance of genetic relationships. 
This strong preference that has been demonstrated by prospective 
parents, to have their own genetic children, is often expressed in terms of 
reproductive freedom and human rights. The concept of procreative liberty, 
being the right to control one’s own reproduction, has been extensively 
discussed, both in terms of negative procreative liberty, a right not to 
reproduce, and a positive entitlement, a right to reproduce8. In the context of 
normal biological reproduction, the practical application of procreative 
liberty seems relatively straightforward as far as it extends to a right to use 
contraception to avoid reproduction, and a right to non-interference with 
one’s natural ability to reproduce. When it comes to the use of artificial 
reproductive technologies, however, the situation is considerably more 
complex and leads to a myriad of questions about how such rights should 
be interpreted and applied in this situation. 
Reproductive rights are often considered in application to 
parenthood as a social as well as a biological institution. The meaning of 
being a parent includes the rearing of children and the establishment of 
social and familial relationships, not just genetic reproduction. Parenthood 
is not merely about reproducing one’s genes. (This has been used to argue 
that individuals who are incapable of assuming responsibility and 
appreciating the social elements of parenthood may not be entitled to the 
right to be a parent9, and that this may therefore place limitations on any 
rights of access to ART10.) While most of the questions regarding 
reproductive rights, ARTs, and parenthood are outside the scope of this 
paper, we want to consider the case of reproductive rights as they apply to 
genetic information and the purely genetic component of parenthood. We 
                                                 
See J. Harris. 2004. On Cloning. London: Routledge. 
7
 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) 
Regulations 2004 
8
 See for example J. Harris & S. Holm. 1998. The Future of Human Reproduction: Ethics, 
Choice and Regulation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, J.A. Robertson. 1996. Children of 
Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, J.A. Robertson. Embryos, families, and procreative liberty: the legal structure of the 
new reproduction. South Calif Law Rev 1986; 59: 939-1041, B. Steinbock. Reproductive 
rights and responsibilities. Hastings Cent Rep 1994; 24: 15-16. 
9
 Steinbock., op cit. 
10
 D. Statman. The right to parenthood: an argument for a narrow interpretation. Ethical 
Perspect 2003; 10: 224-235.. 
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are specifically concerned with whether negative procreative liberty entails 
the right to prevent the implantation, gestation, and bringing to birth of 
one’s embryos11. In particular we are interested in whether any such right 
can be grounded in genetics.  
With regards to the Evans case the question becomes whether or not 
having entered into an agreement to have genetically-related children, and 
having taken steps via the IVF clinic towards such an aim, Mr. Johnston 
could possibly claim a right to not to have the genetically-related children 
that might result from these embryos. 
 
Approaches to the Dilemma 
How to resolve disputes over frozen embryos is a difficult question. Not 
only do these cases invoke complex emotive and intuitive responses, but 
numerous moral, ethical, philosophical and cultural factors. Arguments may 
be produced for each side of the case from perspectives of natural law, 
justice, sexual morality, bodily integrity, investment theory and more. 
Balancing these arguments against each other is nigh-impossible and likely 
to lead to subjective and relativistic conclusions. 
We propose instead to dissect out the issues involved using an 
isolated framework: the concept of embryos as property. There is much to 
recommend this approach: the existence of a system of property ownership 
is an almost universal normative institution, as are many aspects of the 
systems themselves. Property systems are reasonably neutral between 
varying moral theories, cultures and religions, and therefore allow us to 
focus on the question under consideration: what rights over embryos arise 
from property in genetic material? We do not assert that this forms a 
comprehensive solution to frozen embryo disputes; in fact we acknowledge 
that there are many other considerations to be taken into account in such 
cases. However, a property-based approach enables us to consider the 
problem within a normative framework that can deliver a concrete answer 
to the specific question of whether rights over genetic information can give 
rise to rights over IVF embryos. 
 
Property in Genetic Material 
That the human body and its parts and products ought to be subject to 
property considerations is a highly contentious issue.12 Disagreements 
                                                 
11
 Where so doing does not infringe any overriding rights of bodily integrity; in the case of 
embryos in utero, a woman’s right to bodily integrity will conflict with the exercise of any 
negative rights of procreative liberty that might be asserted. We therefore confine our 
discussion to the case of IVF embryos to avoid confusing the issues. 
12
 See G. Calabresi. Do We Own Our Bodies. Health Matrix 1991; 1: 5-18, G.A. Cohen. 
1995. Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
R.E. Gold. 1996. Body Parts: Property Rights and the Ownership of Human Biological 
Materials Washington: Georgetown University Press, J.W. Harris. Who Owns My Body. 
Oxford J Legal Studies 1996; 16: 55-84, S.R. Munzer. Kant and Property Rights in Body 
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regarding this are underlined in discussions regarding genetic material 
where a double dilemma emerges. Some notable situations in relation to 
which the existence of property rights in genetic material have been 
suggested and discussed include cases involving the patenting of genetic 
information, for purposes such as genetic testing and diagnosis13 or as an 
information resource in itself14; as well as cases pertaining to the use of 
genetic material obtained in a diagnostic context for other purposes such as 
research and profit15. 
To properly consider the question of property rights in genetic 
material, it is worth dissecting out the concept of what we mean when we 
refer to “genetic material”, and over exactly what aspects of genetic 
material property rights might be said to exist. 
There are two conceptual components of genetic material to which 
property rights could potentially be applied: these can be termed the 
physical and the informational. The former consists of the physical 
substance in which the genetic material is embodied: tissue samples, cells 
and the DNA itself, the atoms that make up the nucleic acid molecules that 
hold our genetic code. The latter is the genetic information that is contained 
within the physical substance: the code itself, the particular arrangement of 
those atoms that make up the sequences of our genes, the unique 
combination of genes and DNA sequence that forms an individual genome.  
Both the physical and informational components of genetic material 
might potentially be the subject of property rights, but they are conceptually 
separable elements in themselves; thus the rights which might attach to 
each, as well as the grounds and justification for the existence of such 
rights, can be treated separately. Indeed, there are different arguments 
which apply to the consideration of rights in genetic information, as 
opposed to merely the physical genetic material. Part of these arguments 
turn on the question of whether or not genetic information (not the material 
upon/within which it is contained) can even properly be thought to be the 
subject of property rights. It is to this question we now look. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Parts. Canadian J Law Jurispr 1993; VI: 319-341, J. Nedelsky. Property in Potential Life? 
Canadian J Law Jurispr 1993; VI: 343-365. 
13
 For example the patents held by Myriad Genetics covering the breast cancer genes 
BRCA1 and BRCA2, which have been enforced to prevent some researchers from carrying 
out tests on these genes. 
14
 An obvious example of this being the Celera project to sequence the human genome and 
file patents on some of the information thus gleaned. 
15
 Some of the best-known cases in this regard include the Moore case (Moore v Regents 
of University of California 1990 271 CalRptr 146 Supreme Court of California ), in which 
a cell line was developed and patented from a patient’s tissue samples; and the Greenberg 
case (Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, Inc. 2003 264 FSupp2d 
1064 United States District Court, S.D. Florida), in which researchers filed a patent on a 
gene sequence obtained from patients’ samples and genetic information. In both of these 
cases the courts’ final legal analysis rejected the idea of property interests in genetic 
material and biological samples, preferring to frame the patients’ rights in other terms; but 
from a philosophical and ethical perspective the question remains open. 
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Philosophical and Legal Perspectives 
Each of us has particular sets of genes containing our genetic information. 
These genes, and this information, are unique to each of us. It is like having 
a personalised identifier number. And it is this fact combined with the ease 
with which this information can now be obtained and analysed which gives 
rise to concern. Some of the use that this information can be put to include 
identifying individuals, determining relatedness between individuals, and 
the detection genetic mutations and common gene variants. The later two 
applications can be used to identify and predict certain diseases or risk of 
disease. In addition to the multitude of applications of genetic material there 
are also a multitude of individuals and organisations who might be 
interested in it. Some of these include patients, doctors, researchers, the 
police, insurance companies, and the government.  
With such an array of applications of this uniquely personal 
information it is not surprising that there are concerns regarding its misuse. 
Most of these concerns centre on issues of privacy, confidentiality, and 
control as they relate to genetic material and genetic information. Murray 
tells us that: 
[G]enetic information is sufficiently different from other kinds 
of health-related information that it needs special protection.16 
This school of thought is dubbed ‘genetic exceptionalism’ and the genetic 
exceptionalists argue that: 
. . . a property right to one’s genetic information would be the 
most viable means of securing the confidentiality of that 
information.17 
The justification for why we each should have property rights in our own 
genetic material and information can be seen as stemming from a Lockean 
model18, or more recently from a Nozikean model19. These models suppose 
that we all, at least originally, own our own bodies, and that we also own 
the fruits of our labour. Combining these together Steiner contends that: 
Our bodies are factories. They produce things like blood, skin, 
hair, etc. Self-ownership gives us the titles to these and protects 
our liberty to dispose of them, just as it does in the case of our 
non-renewable types of tissue. 20 
 
                                                 
16
 T. Murray. 1997. Genetic Exceptionalism and Future Diaries: Is Genetic Information 
Different from other Medical Information?’ In Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy and 
Confidentiality M. Rothstein, ed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
17
 R.A. Spinello. Property rights in genetic information. Ethics and Inf Tech 2004; 6: 29-
42. 
18
 J. Locke. 1964. The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True 
Original, Extent and End. In John Locke, Two Treatises of Government: A Critical Edition 
with an Introduction and Apparatus Criticus. P. Laslett, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
19
 R. Nozick. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
20
 H. Steiner. 1994. An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Blackwell. p.233. 
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These human materials can be seen as the fruits of our labour, albeit non-
voluntary labour. Steiner continues: 
We each own the fruits of our labour inasmuch as all the 
factors entering into their production are either things already 
owned by us or initially unowned things amounting to no more 
than an equal portion of them.21 
If, therefore, we can be said to own and have property rights in the cells 
which contain our genetic material, and, therefore, to have property rights 
in our genetic material, then it is at least possible that we could also have 
these rights in the information contained therein. 
However, any property rights in genetic information, properly 
thought of, could only be intangible property rights22. This is because, as 
elucidated above, while you may have to go through the physical genetic 
material to get to the information these two components can be separated 
and are conceptually different.. 
There are, of course, opposing arguments advanced against property 
rights in our genetic information. One might claim that while our genetic 
information is unique to each of us we share too much of our genetic code 
with each other (and even with other animals) to justify individuals having 
exclusive property rights over it. Other objections are based on utilitarian 
argument and claim that allowing individual exclusive rights will be a 
deterrent to genetic research and that this would not be in the common 
good23. Added to this might be the arguments that we can have only quasi 
property rights in our genes, that we can have rights in our genetics, but 
they are not property rights, and that maintain that we merely have interests 
and not rights in this area.  
Whatever the philosophical wrangling surrounding genetics it is 
clear that, in some form or another, an individual’s genetic information 
does require protection. This is without doubt recognised in law, although 
trying to untangle the legal genetics web is not easy.  
Foster says that: 
There are only two uncontroversial things about genetics law . . 
. The first is that it matters . . . The second thing is that it is a 
mess.24 
He continues saying that: 
Bemused English lawyers don’t know whether to treat DNA as 
tangible property or intellectual property or human tissue or 
information.25 
                                                 
21
 Ibid., p.236 
22
 For a discussion of the conditions that must be met to satisfy intellectual property claims, 
and how these might apply to genetic information, see A.D. Moore. Owning genetic 
information and gene enhancement techniques: why privacy and property rights may 
undermine social control of the human genome. Bioethics 2000; 14: 97-119.. 
23
 Spinello., op cit. 
24
 C. Foster. Current Issues in the Law of Genetics. New Law J 2003; 153: 29. 
Chan, S. and Quigley, M. ‘Frozen Embryos, Genetic Information, and 
Reproductive Rights’, Bioethics (2007) 21(8): 439-448 
 
The reason for this mess is that the law governing genetics is drawn from a 
multitude of sources, both common law and statutory, and seems to contain 
conflicting ideals. To increase the confusion there is also a range of statutes 
that could potentially be applicable in this area. The genetic subject matter 
covered ranges from issues of confidentiality and privacy, through the 
regulation of the reproductive technologies and therapies (including PIGD, 
stem cell research, and gene therapy), and on to intellectual property in 
genetic material, and the range of statutes that cover these is even wider.26 
While this is somewhat of a mess it cannot be denied that the law 
does recognise some rights of confidentiality, privacy, and control in both 
our genetic material and genetic information. That these rights might be 
property, or at least quasi-property, rights is given further support through 
our patent laws. The Patents Act 1997 (as amended at 29th April 2006) 
states that only inventions can be subject to a patent.27 Discoveries are not 
considered inventions for the purposes of the Act and are, therefore, not 
patentable.28 In relation to genes and genetics this might seem to imply that 
genetic information cannot be patentable, being but a ‘mere discovery’29 but 
as Laurie explains finding a technical solution to an unsolved technical 
problem can overcome this difficulty: 
 . . . locating a previously unknown gene, determining its 
function and making it accessible for further exploitation is an 
example of a technical solution to the pre-existing problem of 
the inaccessibility of the genetic product.30 
This effectively renders the genetic information patentable and the subject 
of intellectual property rights. It can be seen here that intellectual property 
rights in genetics are recognised and are offered due legal protection. 
Thus it can be seen that both philosophically and legally there are 
grounds for considering genetic information to be the subject of property 
rights. These perspectives are not wholly uncontentious but despite 
continuing debate about whether or not genes and genetic information 
ought to be considered in this manner, for the purposes of our paper we will 
assume that they can be. The reason for such a stance is this: if there are no 
property rights, or at least rights of control in genetic information then there 
can be no basis for arguments turning on the right not to have your own 
genetic children. A person must have property rights, or quasi-property 
rights involving control, over their genetic information if we are to make 
sense of such claims.  




 Some of the statutes that cover, or could potentially cover, these include the Data 
Protection Act 1998, the Human Tissues Act 2004, the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990, the Health and Social Care Act 2001, and the Human Reproductive 
Cloning Act 2001. This is all supplemented not only by the relevant common law but by 
various UK regulations and European directives. 
27
 The Patents Act 1997 (as amended at 29th April 2006), s. 1(1). 
28
 Ibid, s. 1(2)(a). 
29
 G. Laurie. 2004. Patenting and the Human Body. In Principles of Medical Law. A. 
Grubb, ed. 2nd edition edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1079-1102. p.1085. 
30
 Ibid. 
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Transfer of Genetic Rights 
We have thus far established that genetic material can be conceptually 
divided into physical and informational components, and that both of these 
could be appropriate subjects for at least quasi-property rights of control. 
Given this, it follows that rights of control over genetic material, 
both physical and information components thereof, like all property rights 
are transferable and can be ceded. Donating blood involves a transfer of 
physical rights from the donor to the blood bank; assenting to DNA being 
extracted from a sample of that blood so that my genes can be sequenced 
for research involves an additional transfer of informational rights to the 
researcher; allowing that sequence to be published may well entail a 
cessation of some informational rights altogether. 
Difficult questions arise when the physical and informational 
properties of genetic material cannot be easily separated. When I send a 
lock of my hair to someone as a sign of affection, I may have given up the 
physical property, but that should not entitle him to extract my DNA and 
make use of the information contained therein; if I consent to allowing my 
genes to be sequenced but refuse to allow a biological sample to be taken, it 
will be difficult to give effect to the transfer of informational rights.  
 
Gametes and Embryos 
Having decided that the physical and informational components of genetic 
material and the rights associated with each, are at least conceptually 
separable, we now turn to considering the application of this model to 
gametes and embryos in the context of artificial reproductive technologies. 
In the case of gametes, this is relatively simple: as for all parts and 
products of our own bodies, we have rights over our physical gametes (that 
is, spermatozoa and oocytes) because they are the fruits of our bodies’ 
labour (albeit non-voluntary). The informational rights we may have over 
gametes are likewise the same as any rights we have over the genetic 
information contained in the somatic tissues of our bodies, because they are 
derived from our own genome. 
According to our analysis of rights over genetic material as 
described above, the rights that exist in gametes can also be transferred or 
ceded. This can be seen to occur when the gametes are given for the 
purpose of reproduction: donating to a sperm bank involves transferring 
physical control of one’s genetic material to another party, as indeed does 
normal unprotected sexual intercourse. To what extent this also entails 
transfer or cessation of informational rights over the genetic material 
contained in gametes is perhaps less clear; this will be discussed further 
below. 
When gametes fuse to form an embryo in the process of in vitro 
fertilisation, the individual rights which the gametic progenitors have over 
the separate gametes are altered. There can be no property or rights claims 
over those gametes because the two separate gametes no longer exist. In 
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their place there is an embryo. Embryos can also be viewed as a type of 
genetic material containing physical and informational property, but both 
the physical and informational components are contributed to by both 
parents. In the case of IVF embryos, the fertility clinic also contributes parts 
(in the form of the culture medium used to nourish the embryos) and 
labour.31  
How are we to break down the rights which pertain to embryos on 
behalf of those who might have a claim? Let us consider first those rights 
which exist in the physical embryo, that clump of cells which may or may 
not become a new human being. Both parents have contributed physical 
material towards the embryo: to whom, then, does it belong? 
A consideration of various models of joint property ownership that 
are invoked when multiple parties contribute to mixed property may be 
useful at this point. One analysis which has often been applied32 separates 
mixed property into the categories of miscible and immiscible property.  
Immiscible property is mixed property of a form such that the 
individual contributions of each party can be distinguished and separated: in 
such a case, each party retains property rights to his or her own 
contribution. For example, if my herd of black cows is mixed with your 
herd of white cows, we each retain ownership of our respective cows, as 
our contributions can be distinguished and separated from each other. 
Miscible property, by contrast, is mixed property in which the previously 
separate components cannot be distinguished. When miscible property is 
created by the mixing of multiple contributions, each contributor becomes a 
joint or co-owner of the mixed property; the extent of shared ownership 
may depend on the original contribution given. For example, if we each 
own a barrel of beer and the contents of the two barrels become mixed, we 
are now the joint owners of the two barrels, each having a half-share in the 
total. A further development affecting joint rights is the investment of 
labour and effort and the creation of something new: this may also alter the 
balance of rights in joint property. An illustration of this might be if I were 
to take your flour and combine it with my eggs to bake a cake: the labour I 
have invested in the baking process and the creation of a substantially 
different new item from the mixed property ought to give me property 
rights over the resulting cake, although you would then have a claim against 
me for the value of your flour.  
When we come to consider how this applies to embryos, it seems 
clear that an embryo is a form of miscible joint property. The component 
physical contributions of sperm and egg cannot be distinguished and 
                                                 
31
 The issue of rights over embryos becomes important because of the availability of 
assisted reproductive technology: if the embryo is in utero, the woman’s right to bodily 
integrity would override any rights of control the father might have over the physical or 
informational property contained in the embryo. 
32
 For discussion and comparative analysis see R.W.J. Hickey. Dazed and Confused: 
Accidental Mixtures of Goods and the Theory of Acquisition of Title. Mod Law Rev 2003; 
66: 368-383.. 
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separated once fertilisation has occurred: both parents therefore share rights 
over the physical embryos. Before that point, the sperm and eggs remain 
separable and separate property rights in them persist, but at the point of 
fertilisation the material/embryos become joint property, and can therefore 
be divided amongst the joint owners according to their relative shares33.  
How would the above analysis apply to disputes over frozen 
embryos? One method of dividing jointly owned embryos into equal shares 
might be to give them half the embryos each, to do with as they chose; or 
each embryo could be split to ensure that each party gets an identical, equal 
share of the property. If the crux of such disputes was only a concern by the 
parties regarding their physical property then such solutions ought to be 
perfectly adequate. However, this is not generally perceived to be the case. 
It is clear that disputes over embryos are not just about the physical 
embryo(s), but about what the embryo represents and what it might 
become, that is, a genetically related child.  
 
Reproduction and Genetic Rights 
Each of us can claim a set of rights in relation to our genetic information, 
the most important of these being the right to genetic privacy and the right 
to control our genetic information. As discussed earlier the recognition of 
such rights ensures that each individual is protected against the misuse of 
this information. However, these rights, like all rights, are not absolute, and 
are necessarily limited by the rights of others and by changing situations.  
In the case of reproduction, one’s rights over one’s genetic 
information are necessarily altered. If it is accepted that we have some 
rights to control our genetic information, and if these extend to a right a 
priori not to have children created as a product of our genetic information, 
then engaging voluntarily in reproduction must entail an intent to give up 
this right. Consenting to give gametes for the purposes of reproduction 
(whether by natural or assisted means), as well as often involving a transfer 
of physical rights, is therefore equivalent to offering to cede one’s 
informational rights for the purpose of creating a new genetic entity.  
This proffered cessation of informational rights occurs as a direct 
result of the agreement to give gametes for the designated purpose. If 
physical property rights in gametes are transferred for a purpose other than 
reproduction, such as research, no giving up of an information-based right 
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 The apportionment of shares in joint property is in proportion to the value of the 
contributions of the property-owners. How this might be determined in relation to IVF 
embryos is an intriguing question. For example, it might be suggested that the woman 
should have a greater right because she has contributed more physical material (as the 
oocyte is physically larger than the sperm) and slightly more of her genetic material (in the 
form of mitochondrial DNA) to the embryo. One might envision various other 
circumstances which might change the relative value, objective or subjective, of each 
partner’s contribution. However for the purposes of our analysis, we assume that the value 
of the property contributed by each parent can be regarded as approximately equal unless 
otherwise specified. 
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not to have genetic children created from those gametes has occurred, 
although other information-based rights may have been ceded as part of the 
transaction – for example, if the research for the purpose of which which 
the gametes were given involved obtaining and using genetic information 
from them34. Similarly, ceding of your informational rights for reproductive 
purposes does not imply the ceding of them for other purposes: providing 
gametes for IVF does not authorise the clinic to use the genetic information 
it holds for purposes other than creating an embryo for reproduction35. 
The creation of IVF embryos for the purposes of reproduction thus 
represents a special situation where the scope of one’s genetic rights 
becomes limited at the point of fertilisation at which the mixing of genetic 
material occurs. 
The reasons for this have been touched on above. Before ‘mixing’ 
the sperm and the ova are the distinct property of their sources. As such 
those individuals can exercise their rights unhindered over their own 
gametes. However, once fertilisation has occurred the individuals cannot be 
seen as having property rights over two distinct entities. If they have 
property rights at all then they can only be joint property rights over the 
ensuing embryo(s). 
In the Evans case Ms. Evans and Mr. Johnston could be considered 
to be the joint owner of their six embryos. As with the model of joint 
ownership outlined above they would share identical claims to the embryos. 
If these parties had agreed as to the fate of their embryos then there would 
have been no problems, the embryos would have been implanted, 
destroyed, or donated for research purposes as they wished. But this, as we 
saw, was not the case. Now if we submit that the two parties are joint-
owners then without adequate justification there can be no trumping claims. 
If this occurs the embryos are left in a state of limbo – they cannot be 
destroyed and they cannot be implanted. Would, therefore, Mr. Johnston’s 
claim of a right not to have the possible ensuing genetically related children 
constitute a justifiable trumping claim? 
When Mr. Johnston agreed to engage in IVF for the purposes of 
having a child with Ms. Evans as soon as his sperm fertilised her ovum he 
ceded any right he might have had not to become the genetic father of the 
child that embryo would become. This would equally apply had their roles 
been reversed and he wanted the embryos but she did not. He, however, 
would have had the additional problem of finding a surrogate to gestate the 
                                                 
34
 These rights are often phrased in terms of consent rather than property rights; however as 
we have discussed, any requirement for consent to the use of genetic material and genetic 
information implies a right of control over such material in the first place, which can be 
viewed as a type of property right. 
35
 This may be illustrated by analogy with the use of other personal information: simply 
because a patient gives their doctor medical information does not imply that the doctor can 
use it for any purpose he may choose. The information held on the medical record may be 
used for the patients own health care. The possession of this information by the doctor does 
not authorise, without consent, use of the information for other purposes, nor does it imply 
a wider public access. 
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embryos for him. Mr. Johnston had effectively given up a portion of the 
rights he may have had over his genetic information for the purposes of 
creating a new genetically-related entity. Once his embryo had been created 
he no longer had the right to prevent its birth on the grounds of not wanting 
a genetically-related child. 
To explain this more fully, let us consider the sequence of events 
and associated transfers of rights that take place in the creation of IVF 
embryos. Each parent has de novo physical and informational rights over 
their separate gametes, and at any point up until fertilisation they retain 
those rights. By proposing to create an embryo, however, each party is 
offering to cede some part of their informational rights in the gametes that 
are given with that intent, for the purpose of creating a new form of 
information: the new genetic entity. When fusion of the egg and sperm to 
form an embryo occurs, that embryo may be regarded physically as 
immiscible joint property in which both parents have physical property 
rights. This also constitutes the formation of the new genetic entity in 
respect of which informational rights were ceded. 
Once this has taken place, the implantation and gestation of the 
embryo does not involve any further informational use of the genetic 
material contributed by each party. At the point of fertilisation, the new 
genetic entity comes into existence; any subsequent changes and 
developments that happen during the process take place at the physical 
level, but no further informational manipulation occurs. The genetic 
information contained in an embryo, or even a fertilised egg, is the same as 
that contained in the fully-grown infant or adult. There is no point trying to 
reclaim a right not to have a new genetic entity created from your genetic 
information when the act of creation has already taken place. 
The implication of this is plain and simple: once you have given up 
your genetic informational rights in this manner you cannot take them back. 
The creation of IVF embryos involves both parents giving up some rights 
over their genetic information in pursuit of the creation of the embryos: 
once this has occurred, any right of the parents not to have those embryos 
created (as new genetic entities from their genetic information) is lost, and 
only the physical rights to the embryos persist. By way of example imagine 
that the IVF clinic could store an embryo’s genetic information independent 
of any physical components contributed by the parents. If they could do this 
it would be the case that even when the physical embryo was destroyed 
they could legitimately re-create that embryo for either parent, even in the 
absence of agreement from the other. Therefore, where there is dispute over 
the fate of IVF embryos the ‘not wanting a genetically-related child’ 
argument from one of the parties cannot supply adequate grounds to 
prevent the implantation and bringing to birth of the embryos.  
All of this, however, is not to say that there can be no grounds upon 
which to stop the implantation and gestation of those embryos, and eventual 
birth of a child. Other arguments such as ones surrounding the welfare of 
the child might suffice, genetic informational or genetic-relatedness ones, 
however, will not. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued that the act of creating embryos through IVF 
constitutes giving up some rights over genetic information specifically for 
the purposes of reproduction, and that once this has taken place, a right 
based in genetic information cannot be asserted to prevent one’s genetic 
children being born. We have not, however, attempted to produce a 
definitive answer to the broader question of whether a general right not to 
have one’s own genetic children exists. Certainly if it does, it is waived at 
the point of agreeing to reproduce, whether that be by sexual intercourse or 
in vitro fertilisation; but can such a right even be logically and 
philosophically justified36? 
A discussion and analysis of these more general ideas is, 
unfortunately, outside the scope of this paper. However, we can state some 
limited conclusions regarding rights over reproduction and genetic 
information in the context of artificial reproduction and IVF embryos. If 
gametes and embryos are to be considered as subject to property interests, 
then the physical material and the genetic information can be treated as 
separate components of the property. Whilst parents may retain joint 
physical property rights in the embryos as a result of their physical 
contributions (in the form of gametes), the changes to informational rights 
that occur as a result of IVF should be considered differently. We submit 
that an agreement to create IVF embryos from one’s gametes constitutes 
giving up certain rights over genetic information for the specific purpose of 
genetic reproduction (that is, creating a new genetic entity using one’s 
genetic information), and that once fertilisation takes place, these rights 
cease to exist. It may be that the parents have some informational rights that 
persist in the embryo or resulting child, but they do not have the right to 
prevent an embryo being brought to birth on genetic grounds. There can, 
therefore, be no right not to have a genetically related child with a partner 
once IVF embryos have been created from your gametes; and where there is 
dispute over the fate of IVF embryos the ‘not wanting a genetically related 
child’ argument from one of the parties cannot supply adequate grounds to 
prevent the implantation and bringing to birth of the embryos. 
 
                                                 
36
 There is an obvious logical objection to the existence of a right not to have one’s own 
genetic children. Consider the situation of identical twins who share the same genetic 
information. If there were a right not to have your own genetic children, you ought to have 
the right to stop your twin from reproducing and hence creating offspring who would be 
genetically yours. As this is evidently not the case, it cannot be that there is always a right 
to prevent one’s genetic children from coming into existence. 
